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“In trying to explain the role of the Secretary of State, George Schultz likens it to the
more mundane occupation of gardening …the constant nurturing of a complex array of
actors, interests and goals….Schultz’s former Stanford University colleague and pupil,
current Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, wants to try something different….She
describes this as ‘transformational diplomacy,’ not just accepting the world as it is, but
trying to change it. Rice’s ambition is not just to be a gardener—she wants to be a land-
scape architect.”   Chollet (2005)
“If there is one soft power gift America does possess, it is this tendency to imagine new
worlds....Stephen Sestanovich [argues ] that American diplomacy is often most effective
when it pursues not an ‘incrementalist’ but a ‘maximalist’ agenda, leaping over allies
and making the crude, bold, vantage-shifting proposal—like pushing for the reunifi-
cation of Germany when almost everyone else was trying to preserve the so-called sta-
bility of the Warsaw Pact.”   Brooks (2005)
Foreign policy is usually over-determined. The “national interest” often
appears to be an immutable dictation of the international system and of
domestic politics. As Henry Kissinger put it when he was Secretary of
State, “the essential outlines of U.S. policy will remain the same no mat-
ter who wins the U.S. Presidential election” (Wittkopf, 2003, 524). Yet
sometimes, “reality” is more malleable than it first appears. Not so long
ago, it seemed “unimaginable” that the Soviet Union would disappear and
Germany would be peacefully reunited. As former National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft put it in 2003, the main divisions in foreign pol-
icy today are not between liberals and conservatives, but between the tra-
ditionalists and the transformationalists.1 The transformationalists believe that “we know what has to be
done and have the power to do it. What has to be done is to transform the Middle East into a collection
of democracies. That will bring peace and stability” (Rothkopf, 2005, 428). Transformational leadership
has become a central part of the current debate about American foreign policy. 
Academics are generally skeptical about the role of individuals and transformational foreign policies.
Kenneth Waltz, for example, has argued that explanations of international events cluster under three
images or levels of analysis: the international system, the nature of the domestic regime, and individual
leaders. He ranks their explanatory value in that order, and most recent social science focuses on the first
two (Waltz, 1959). While there are many good biographies, there has been relatively little comparative
work on the roles of individual leaders in shaping foreign policy. Of course, at the anecdotal level it is not
difficult to assert that leaders matter: Witness the consequences of the different solutions that Bismarck,
the Kaiser, and Hitler chose to solve “the German problem.” Or imagine a counterfactual situation in
which a few hundred voters had chosen differently in Florida in 2000. A hypothetical President Gore
would probably have invaded Afghanistan, but might not have invaded Iraq. 
But is there anything general we can say about the value that is added by individuals? Is transformation-
al leadership possible in foreign policy? If so, what does it mean and how and when does it occur and
succeed?2
These questions, of course, are a subset of the classic question of human agency in history: To what extent
do leaders matter? In the 19th century, Carlyle and Spencer took opposing views, and Marx famously
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pointed out that men make history but not under the conditions of their own choosing. More recently,
Richard Samuels has compared Japan and Italy over the last 150 years and demonstrated the long-term
effects of leaders’ choices. As he puts it, everything is determined, but some leaders choose to select
against the structural forces (Samuels, 2003, 4).   
There will never be definitive answers to such questions; contemporary philosophers still debate the age
old issue of free will. Can we learn something about the role of individuals in foreign policy by turning
to current leadership theory? Is it meaningful to use their term “transformational leadership” in the field
of foreign policy? Perhaps not. There is a rich literature, but the leadership field is currently dominated
by management experts and psychologists who usually focus on organizations. Thus they build theory
and conduct experiments in a context that is very different from foreign policy. Nonetheless, it is worth a
look. This paper is an early exploration. 
LEADERSHIP THEORIES
There are various definitions of leadership, and I will use a simple one that defines leaders as those who
help a group define and pursue shared objectives.3 This has the virtue of being close to the standard dic-
tionary definition, which says leaders show the way by going before or along. It is also purely descriptive
in a field where some definitions mix normative with descriptive dimensions. The social role of leader
may switch among members of a group, and sometimes the person in a formal role of authority may not
be the most effective leader in a group. The role of effective leader depends upon others accepting social
roles as followers. 
Leadership as a process has three components: leaders, followers, and a relationship between them that
varies with time and context. Each deserves attention. As we will see below, we can look at different types
of leaders, different situations, and different followers. National leaders interact with concentric circles of
followers. Domestically they include an inner team which has direct contact; and outer circles of public
opinion that include true believers, obedient citizens, bystanders, and opponents. When conducting for-
eign policy, leaders interact with similar circles beyond their national borders. A leader in the eyes of one
circle of followers may not appear so to other circles, and the strength of followership may vary over time. 
Early leadership research sought to identify the traits that were characteristic of leaders. While some traits
seem to hold up across multiple contexts, many do not. For example, early work by psychologists found
a positive but weak relationship between IQ and successful leadership (Stogdill, 1948, 25-46). More
recent studies have found that IQ is positively related to successful outcomes in low stress situations, but
negatively correlated in high stress situations where experience and tacit knowledge weighs more heavi-
ly than analytical skills (Fiedler, 2002, 96-101). Context, including followers’ perceptions of their needs,
is crucial. When the contexts are carefully specified, analysis of traits may be more fruitful, as we will see
when we look at certain traits and skills related to presidential leadership and foreign policy in the final
section below.
One of the most prominent paradigms in the current leadership literature is neo-charismatic and trans-
formational theory. In the 1970s and 80s, leadership theorists rediscovered Max Weber’s concept of
charisma which he defined as “the quality of an individual personality by which he is set apart ...and treat-
ed as endowed with superhuman or exceptional powers…” (Weber, 1921). Weber believed that charisma
was an ideal type not to be found in history in pure form. He was also careful to point out that charisma





































lowers “as long as it receives recognition and is able to satisfy the followers or disciples. But this lasts only
so long as the belief in its charismatic inspiration remains.” (Weber, 1921, 238) For example, as Hitler’s
success increased in the 1930s, so did the circles of those who saw him as charismatic. And as he failed
in 1944-45, those circles shrank, leaving just a small group of “true believers” in Hitler’s innermost
circle. Weber was careful not to reify an indefinable personal trait, but to locate charisma in the relation-
ship or social process, though not all theorists have been careful about specifying the process (Solomon,
2002, 83). As Ann Ruth Willner correctly notes, to locate the source of charisma, do not develop a list of 
individual traits, but locate the source in the factors that call forth such perceptions from followers. These
factors, such as a sense of crisis or deep social and psychological needs, are likely to vary with times, soci-
eties and cultures. (Willner, 1984, 15) 
Recent theorists use the term “charismatic” to refer to a leadership process that relies on personal and
inspirational power resources rather than official or positional power.4 R.J. House, for example, describes
the behavior of charismatic leaders as including: communication, vision, confidence, being an exemplar,
and impression management (House, 1976). Bernard Bass defines a charismatic leadership process as one
where a leader influences followers by arousing strong emotions and identification with the leader (Bass,
1998). The virtue of such definitions is that they allow for degrees of charisma and can vary with situational
context. As Janice Beyer has put it, “the neo-charismatic and transformational leadership paradigms have
tamed the original concept of charisma…” (Beyer, 1999, 308) In principle, charisma can be measured by
surveys of followers. Charisma is not the only source of personal or attractive (as opposed to positional)
power, and in current usage, charisma is widely treated as a synonym for “personal magnetism.” It is in
this sense that I use the term as a component of inspirational leadership which I discuss below.
This approach separates description from normative judgment. Charisma is not good or bad per se. Kets
de Vries has pointed out the dangers of negative charismatic leaders who are too narcissistic: grandiose
projects, failure on details of implementation, failure to delegate credit and empower followers, failure to
develop successors, no institutionalization (Kets de Vries, 1988 ). James Jones, who led more than 900
people to commit mass suicide in Guyana in the 1970s was an effective charismatic leader, at least for his
circle of true believers, but normatively we would not say he was a good one judged by outcomes
(Lindholm, 1990).
The needs of followers are the other essential component of the relationship that creates charismatic lead-
ership. It is more likely to emerge when followers have strong felt needs for change, often in the context
of personal or social crisis. For example, was Winston Churchill a charismatic leader? Not in 1939, when
he was widely regarded as a washed up back bench Tory MP. But his vision, confidence, communications
skills and example made him charismatic in the eyes of the British people and the needs they felt after
the fall of France and Dunkirk (Lukacs, 1999). In a sense, Hitler’s actions transformed Churchill from a
back bencher into one of the great leaders of the 20th century. And Hitler himself was a charismatic
leader in the eyes of many Germans of the depression era, though he fits the description of a negative
charismatic leader, and would not be seen as charismatic by most Germans today. Or to take a contem-
porary example, Helmut Kohl described Bill Clinton as charismatic, and Clinton certainly possesses indi-
vidual traits of empathy, communication and personal magnetism. But in historical terms, no situations
arose during Clinton’s presidency which led broad circles of followers to feel deep needs that led them to
attribute lasting charisma to him (Harris, 2005, 5). Of course, individuals differ in the magnetism of their
personalities, but the terms charismatic or inspirational leadership are most useful if one sees such lead-
















































Leadership theorists developed the idea of transformational (or transforming) leadership in the 1970s
and 80s. The concept builds upon but differs from charismatic leadership. In 1978, James McGregor
Burns distinguished transformational from transactional leaders (Burns, 1978). The former mobilize
power for change by appealing to their followers’ higher ideals and moral values such as liberty, justice,
and peace rather than baser emotions of fear, greed, and hatred. They use conflict and crisis to raise their
followers’ consciousness and transform them. Conversely, transactional leaders motivate followers by
appealing to their self interest. On the continuum of interests that stretches from the individual to the
collectivity for most social groups, transformational leaders appeal more to the collective interests of the
group and transactional leaders more to individual interests. This tendency is neither good nor bad per
se, but has to be judged normatively in terms of particular situations and needs of groups. 
Judging which needs or interests are higher depends on whose values are applied. Although he referred
to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, the question of what constitutes “higher ideals” imported a normative
dimension into Burns’s categories. Burns is explicit about this: in his more recent work, Transforming
Leadership, he states that “bad leadership means no leadership” (Burns, 2003, 2). As Barbara Kellerman
and others have argued, this creates a serious problem for descriptive analysis (Kellerman, 2003). 
In 1985, Bernard Bass turned Burns’s distinction into a purely descriptive categorization, though he later
added a normative element as well. According to Bass, transformational leaders induce followers to tran-
scend their self interest for the sake of the higher purposes of the organization that provides the context
of the relationship. Followers are thus inspired to do more than they originally expected based on self
interest alone. For Bass, charisma is a necessary but not sufficient condition for transformational leader-
ship (Bass, 1994, 4-6). Bass also expanded his definition to add a cognitive element of “intellectual stim-
ulation”–broadening followers’ awareness of situations and new perspectives–and “individualized
consideration”–providing support and developmental experiences to followers rather than treating them
as mere means to an end. As Gary Yukl notes, this formulation is not conceptually clear. Some charis-
matic leaders are not transformational, and some transformational leaders are not charismatic. In prac-
tice, it may be rare to find the two characteristics in long-term equilibrium (Yukl, 1999, 300).
Transformational leaders seek to empower and elevate their followers. Some charismatic leaders also
empower their followers, but others do quite the opposite and seek to keep their followers weak and
dependent. They want personal loyalty rather than commitment to group ideals. As stated, Bass sees
charisma as necessary but not sufficient for transformational leadership. Bass also added to Burns’s
transactional category by arguing that transactional leaders create incentives to influence followers’
efforts and make clear the work that is needed to obtain rewards. The two types of leadership processes
are not mutually exclusive, and many leaders can use both styles at different times in different contexts.
Moreover, although transformational leadership is sometimes treated as synonymous with effectiveness,
the empirical evidence shows that to be a doubtful proposition. 
When one goes beyond organizational behavior and considers national politics, there is significant con-
fusion regarding what constitutes a transformational leader. For example, as described by Robert Caro,
Senator Lyndon Johnson deeply wanted to transform racial injustice in the South, but he did not preach
to or inspire a new vision in his fellow senators (Caro, 2002). Instead he used a very transactional style
of detailed bullying and bargaining to achieve his transformational objectives in passing civil rights 
legislation that was anathema to many of the supporters who had made him majority leader. Was he a





































mational leader, and in the 1930s, he used inspirational communications to help achieve his transfor-
mational goals of social reform; but he also used very indirect transactional means, such as the destroy-
ers for bases deal, to pursue his goal of transforming American foreign policy toward support of Great
Britain before World War II. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, his followers were ready for transfor-
mation on social issues, but not on foreign policy. 
THREE USES OF “TRANSFORMATIONAL”
Some of the confusion about what is a transformational leader can be avoided by distinguishing three dif-
ferent things that are covered by the overlapping uses of one term. It helps to separate a leader’s: objec-
tives, means (i.e., the style of using power), and outcomes. 
1. Objectives. Some leaders mobilize followers to pursue new goals. In this sense they are transforma-
tional. (Whether the goals are better or worse is an important but separate normative question.) Others
reflect or encourage followers’ preferences for the status quo goals or mere incremental changes in objec-
tives. But for this dimension, “transactional” is not the best antonym to transformational. “Status quo”
would be a more accurate term. 
We can locate leaders’ objectives on a continuum between seeking total
transformation and preserving the status quo. More specifically, leaders
may seek to preserve the status quo, make incremental changes, accel-
erate existing changes, redirect or reverse changes, or reinitiate changes
(Sternberg, 2002, 17). We should use the word transformational for
leaders whose objectives cluster toward one end of this continuum and
challenge prevailing orthodoxies in a fundamental way. Operationally,
in terms of Sternberg’s categorization of seven types of change, I con-
sider objectives that seek replication, redefinition, and forward incrementation as status quo, while objec-
tives that seek accelerated forward motion, redirection, divergent motion and reinitiated motion I label
transformative. There is no contradiction between a leader having transformational objectives on some
issues and at some times, but not others. Churchill sought to transform the balance of power in Europe by
demanding the unconditional surrender of Germany, but he did not want to see the decolonization of the
British Empire. Richard Nixon wanted to transform American foreign policy toward China, but he did so
in order to balance what he saw as the growing power of the Soviet Union. We can still make aggregate
judgments of leaders’ overall transformational postures, and more refined assessments by issue. 
During the 20th century, for example, the two Roosevelts, Wilson, Truman, and George W. Bush pursued
significantly transformational objectives on grand strategy, or the central security issues of foreign poli-
cy. Taft, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Eisenhower, Johnson, Ford, George H.W. Bush and Clinton did not.
Nixon, Carter and Reagan pursued partially transformational objectives in terms of adjusting the tactics
of the balance of power by improving relations with China in the Nixon’s case; Carter’s adding serious
pursuit of human rights to foreign policy; and Reagan’s rhetoric about change in the Soviet Union. But
all were within a Cold War doctrine of containment that even Reagan did not fundamentally alter. George
H.W. Bush skillfully managed the transition to a “new world order” that Reagan (and more importantly,
Gorbachev) helped to start, but he did not very clearly express transformational objectives. As he put it,
“We, of course, did not (and could not) anticipate what was about the happen as we came into office….We
set the right tone of gentle encouragement to the reformers of Eastern Europe…” (Bush & Scowcroft,
1998, 565). And some who pursued transformational objectives failed to achieve them; Woodrow Wilson
is a prime example. 
“There is no contradiction between
a leader having transformational
objectives on some issues and 
at some times, but not others.”
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2. Outcomes. We must also consider whether a leader was successful in achieving his (or her) transforma-
tional objectives. If he was, we give him that label; for cases in which he was not successful, such as Wilson,
we reserve the term “failed transformational.” Of course, this category can only be judged post hoc, and even
then there are difficult judgment calls. While there is an interesting question of how to weigh delayed and
intergenerational effects in judging leaders’ success, I will use a threshold of success during an administra-
tion and its two successors. When one goes beyond a decade or two, causation becomes blurred. Wilson left
a lasting legacy in American opinions about foreign policy, but if his objectives are judged by changes in the
world during his lifetime, or in the next three administrations, he failed.
The attribution of causation is difficult in complex international affairs, and luck sometimes plays a key
role. That is why Machiavelli gave so much credit to “fortuna.” Consider that if Wilson had died rather
than been disabled by his stroke in 1919, the U.S. Senate would probably have passed the Versailles Treaty
and Wilson would be judged a successful transformational leader. And if Hitler had not given Franklin
Roosevelt the gift of declaring war on the United States after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt might not have been
able to come promptly to Britain’s aid in Europe before replying to the Japanese attack. Moreover, lead-
ers may be successful transformationalists on some dimensions but not on others–witness Burns’s
description of Roosevelt’s failure to transform the Democratic Party (Burns, 2002). Moreover, some
transformations may take the form of unintended consequences. George H.W. Bush presided over the
major transformation of the international system that occurred at the end of the Cold War, but in his
words: “Did we see what was coming when we entered office? No, we did not, nor could we have planned
it” (Bush & Scrowcroft, 1998, xiii). Finally, success, however judged, still leaves open normative questions
for further judgment. Nonetheless, we can generally say post hoc that a leader succeeded or not in the
transformational outcomes he or she pursued. 
There is also a second important dimension of outcomes that can only be judged post hoc, and that is the
lasting effect on followers of the inspiration or vision that leaders expound. This effect is central to
Burns’s account of transformational leadership. In some cases, the emotional and cognitive appeal of a
vision has a lasting transformative impact on followers. Mahatma Ghandi, Nelson Mandela, and Martin
Luther King are often cited as prototypical examples of leaders who had a lasting effect on the values of
a number, though not all, of their followers. Franklin Roosevelt had such a lasting effect on the attitudes
of many of his followers on issues of social security (broadly defined). Leaders are educators, and even
when they do not transform the world, they may transform the foreign policy positions of some follow-
ers. Woodrow Wilson may have failed to achieve his objectives of transforming the world, but he had a
more lasting effect on the attitudes of many Americans, including FDR, about promoting democracy and
international organizations (Kissinger, 1992). This role of the transformational leader as exemplar and
teacher is affected, but not solely determined by success measured in achieving the tangible changes stat-
ed in the inspirational message. For some religious leaders, the relationship between worldly success and
transforming followers’ attitudes can be remote. This is less likely in foreign policy.
The durability of the lessons taught by transformational leaders in foreign policy can only be judged post
hoc. And the value of the lessons taught is a separate normative question–witness disputes to this day
about Wilson’s legacy of promoting democracy abroad. While it is possible to speak of transformational
leaders who “turn the work over to the people” and help a group better accomplish its goals, the value of
the goals is a separate question (Heifetz, 1994). For example, there is a debate in the leadership literature
about whether Hitler was a leader. For Burns, this is impossible because he has ruled out the possibility
by definition (Burns, 2003). Hitler was a mere power wielder who relied on coercion. But as David Hume
noted two centuries ago, even coercive leaders have to attract some henchmen to help carry out their coer-
cion (Hume, 1985). Some degree of attractive or soft power is a necessary condition of leadership, but it


















































































Leadership always entails some degree of soft power, but it may also include large elements of hard
power. (Nye, 2004) To banish coercion from the arsenal of a leader’s power resources seems odd from a
descriptive perspective. Hitler was a transformational leader who inspired his followers to change their
objectives and taught them lessons which changed their lives. He also used coercion against those who
refused to follow. For a decade he succeeded. But in the longer term, Hitler was a failed transformation-
al leader. Not only can one normatively condemn his lessons, but objectively one can judge (post hoc) that
the outcome of his transformative lessons ultimately proved disastrous for the German people.5 But such
judgment of outcomes should not be ruled out by definition. 
3. Means or style of using power. Transformational means or style is harder to pin down. Here the 
concept is at its weakest. For Bass, transactional style rests on contingent reinforcement (rewards and
punishments) while transformational style moves beyond followers’ self interest and is emotionally and
intellectually stimulating. But as Bass says, most leaders use both styles, so it is difficult to categorize a leader
as purely one or the other (Bass, 1998). Moreover, as he points out, some leaders with an inspirational style,
like the Civil War general George McClellan, were loved by their troops but totally feckless in battle. In 
addition to the complex case of Senator Lyndon Johnson cited above, Harry Truman was a successful trans-
formational leader who was not particularly inspirational in his style. 
Bass argues that transactional leadership style is more likely to emerge and be effective in stable and 
predictable environments; in contrast, a transformational style is more likely under conditions of rapid or
discontinuous change (Bass, 1998, 52). But is it the pre-existing style of the leader or the new conditions that
make the leader’s style transformational? Consider the case of Churchill described above. 
It might be more useful to distinguish leadership types by the way a leader uses the hard and soft power
resources that are available in various situations. In democratic polities (though not necessarily in their 
foreign policies), force is not a significant power option, so the continuum is truncated. At the hard end is
bullying, buying and bargaining. At the soft end are ideas, attraction and emotional inspiration (the “tamed”
version of charisma). As Harry Truman observed, “I sit here all day trying to persuade people to do the things
they ought to have sense enough to do without my persuading them….That’s all the powers of the President
amount to” (Neustadt, 1990).
We can use the terms “transactional style” to characterize the bullying, buying and bargaining that leaders do
at the hard end of the spectrum to affect the self interest of followers and “inspirational style” to characterize
leadership that rests on charisma and other personal power resources at the soft end of the spectrum.
Inspirational is a clearer antonym than transformational in this context, and using a separate term avoids con-
fusion of means with objectives. Inspiration that broadens followers’ perspectives and raises their sights above
their short term interests is likely to lead to a higher morality judged in terms of the groups shared interests,
and participation in such a perspective may give them a greater sense of empowerment. But as discussed above,
this should be judged empirically after the fact, not simply assumed. Some inspirational leaders may be decep-
tive. Bass seems to have realized this point when he amended his original definition of transformational (which
includes charisma) to allow for what he termed “pseudo-transformational” leaders (Bass & Steidlmeier, 2004).
By sticking to descriptive language, we can see how different leaders used power and reserve our normative
judgments for the ends to which they put that power. Inspirational leadership may or may not be a good thing
in any particular context. That determination requires a separate normative judgment.
Combining these two categories produces a two by two matrix in which you can have transformational
leaders who mostly use a transactional style (Harry Truman); transformational leaders who are strongest
on inspirational style (Woodrow Wilson); status quo leaders with a transactional style (Dwight Eisenhower)
and status quo leaders who often use an inspirational style (Bill Clinton). 
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Or, more accurately, since there is a continuum of objectives regarding change between transformation and sta-
tus quo on one axis, and a continuum between transactional and inspirational styles of using power resources
on the other, one could display leaders in various positions of a two dimensional space rather than restrict them
only to one of the four quadrants. Franklin Roosevelt, for example is difficult to so restrict to one quadrant.
Organizational leadership theorists might claim that they too could display leaders in such a matrix which
would allow the terms transformational/transactional to be used on both axes of objectives and style. One
would then speak of “doubly transformational” and “singly transformational” leaders. But in my view,
such language becomes awkward and confusing. Unpacking the terms, as I have suggested here, is likely
to provide greater clarity for analysis. When studying political leadership and foreign policy, it would be
best for analytical clarity to scrap the use of the word “transformational” as descriptive of style, and restrict
its use to describing objectives and outcomes regarding the condition of the world and the state of mind
of a leader’s followers as described above. 
The use of the antonyms “transformational vs. status quo” and
“transactional vs. inspirational” does not diminish Bass’s insight
relating leadership style to contexts (Bass, 1998). We would expect
transactional leadership to be more frequent and effective in stable
predictable environments, and inspirational leadership to be more
frequent in periods of rapid and discontinuous change. Crisis condi-
tions can liberate a gifted leader from the accumulated constraints
from pressure groups and bureaucracies that normally inhibit action.
Followers experience new or accentuated needs. They look for new
guidance. Action becomes more fluid. As Charles Hermann, pointed
out some time ago, in foreign policy crises, the highest levels of government are involved, bureaucratic
procedures can be more easily side-stepped, information is at a premium, analogies are often used in the
absence of adequate information, and substantial energy is devoted to mobilizing support for whatever
decision is eventually made (Hermann, 1969, 416).
Even in crisis situations, however, different leaders may respond in different ways. For example, Neville
Chamberlain, a status quo leader with a transactional style, responded very differently to the changed con-
text in Europe than did Churchill, a transformational leader with a more inspirational style. The change
in Britain from one leader to the other reflected changes in the context, which affected the followers and
led to a change in their preference of whom they wanted in the leader’s role. But even two transforma-
tional leaders may differ in response to the same crisis. In the prelude to World War I, both Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson could be considered leaders with transformational objectives and inspi-
rational styles. But the American public was less responsive to Roosevelt’s balance of power arguments
for entering the war than to Wilson’s appeal to the idealist tradition.
Henry Kissinger has argued that Wilson’s idealism had a more profound effect in transforming
American public opinion about foreign policy than did Roosevelt’s realism. That is true, but in a sense
Wilson did less to transform his followers’ traditional American conceptions of international politics than
Roosevelt attempted. In the short run, with the help of German actions, Wilson was more successful in
moving the American public into action, and his Fourteen Points expressed significantly transforma-
TRANSACTIONAL STYLE INSPIRATIONAL STYLE
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tional objectives in regard to world politics. But in another sense, his objectives were less transformative
than Roosevelt’s in regard to changing the views of the American public. Wilson was appealing to an
existing tradition of American exceptionalism, while Roosevelt was trying to persuade Americans to
adopt a style of realism which was more in the European tradition. 
In any event, such paired comparisons of responses to the same world events may help to illuminate dif-
ferences in leadership objectives and styles. Other possibilities include Carter and Reagan’s response to
Soviet power in the late 1970s-early 1980s, Peres and Sharon’s response to the Palestinian question and
Johnson and Fulbright’s responses to Vietnam. 
THE FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT
As mentioned above, context is the third side of the leadership triangle. Leadership varies with context,
and foreign policy leaders are working in a significantly different context from domestic politics. In the
face of frustrating domestic pressures, presidents sometimes turn to foreign policy where they feel less
constrained in the role of commander in chief. But this does not mean that transformational leadership
is easier in foreign policy than in domestic politics. On the contrary, it is interesting to note that presi-
dents such as Wilson, FDR (before 1941), Johnson, and Reagan found it easier to be transformational in
domestic than in foreign policy. Foreign policy involves initiating and responding to changes in the sur-
rounding world. Correctly intuiting the direction and pace of external changes, designing appropriate
responses that match goals and resources, educating diverse followers to see the changes and support
policies and implementing such policies through a combination of hard and soft power are the essential
requirements of foreign policy leadership. 
One key difference between the domestic and foreign policy contexts is systemic effects. Foreign policy
leaders have to think of the effects of their actions not only on individuals and states, but on the interna-
tional system as well. Moreover, given the complexity of the international system, it is harder for individ-
uals to make a difference (Byman & Pollack, 2001, 107.) States are not homogenous or equal in size, and
leaders of the American superpower have more responsibilities for systemic effects, including leading by
example, than do leaders of small weak states. But even for small states, a leader like Lee Kuan Yew had
a positive influence and Kim Jong Il a negative one beyond the scale of his country. 
A second major difference of the foreign policy context is the “audience problem.” Leaders have very dif-
ferent sets of followers: domestic and foreign, and the latter includes not only other governments, but
also civil societies which may differ from their governments. This could be called the two (or multiple)
audience problem, and it is becoming more important in a world of instantaneous global communica-
tion. There are not only multiple circles of followers domestically, but internationally as well.
Communications usually reach both foreign and domestic audiences simultaneously, but are heard in
very different ways because of cultural and national differences. It is hard to appeal to all followers at
once. Some leaders manage both–Wilson’s triumphal tour of Europe in 1919 is an example; but even that
did not last. Sometimes leaders retain more followers abroad than at home–witness Clinton in 1999. Or
conversely, George W. Bush was more successful throughout his first term at appealing to American audi-
ences than to foreign audiences. While his popularity remained sufficient to earn re-election in 2004,
polls overseas showed that much of the decline in American attractiveness or soft power was attributed
to his policies (Nye, 2004). The extent to which this matters can be debated. For some, it was essential to
change the expectations of foreign audiences in order to transform the Middle East, the major contem-















































Department has argued that “anti-Americanism is anything but cost-free. In the short run, it affects how
much cooperation and burden sharing can be generated….There is also a long term price to be paid…as
people who come of age hating the United States will one day come to power mistrustful of the United
States or worse” (Haass, 2005, 202). Whether the costs will exceed the benefits will not be known for
some time, but the management of multiple audiences has been difficult. 
A third difference between domestic and foreign policy contexts is that the spectrum of power resources
is not truncated as it is in democratic polities. Democratic politicians rarely have occasion to use force at
home, but force remains a critical hard power resource in world politics and leaders ignore it at their
peril. When Burns excludes force as a resource for leaders (by definition, he calls them rulers rather than
leaders) he is avoiding a critical leadership issue that arises in foreign policy. Hard and soft power can
substitute, reinforce or interfere with each other. Leaders have to be aware of how to blend hard and soft
power in a productive rather than counter-productive way. That is smart power. George H.W. Bush was
good at it; in his first term George W. Bush was not.
The challenge is not new; Machiavelli’s observations on combining hard and soft power in the 16th cen-
tury Italian city-state system remain relevant in some parts of the world today. He noted that punishment
must sometimes be excessive and notable to be effective (Machiavelli, 1952). Many in the George W. Bush
administration argued that a strong military response after the September 11 terrorist attacks was neces-
sary to reverse the lessons that terrorists had learned about “weak” American responses since 1983. But
the foreign policy context is not a single domain. Force may be productive in one dimension and coun-
terproductive in another. Among post modern democracies, there is a Kantian world of complex interde-
pendence in which all are from Venus, and force can be counter productive in the eyes of followers at
home and abroad. In industrializing and pre-modern domains, however, the ethos of Mars remains pres-
ent, and the prospect of force and violence must be part of a leader’s calculation of means whether his
objectives are transformational or status quo (Kagan, 2003; Cooper, 2004). A foreign policy leader has to
understand both hard and soft power resources, and when and how to combine them. 
More specifically, in the American foreign policy context, executive branch leaders have to be alert not
only to changes in public opinion, but also to how it is refracted through the Congress. American gov-
ernment consists of separate institutions sharing power, and Congress has a greater role in foreign policy
than do legislatures in parliamentary democracies. As one expert put it, the Constitution does not assign
foreign policy to the president, but rather establishes “an invitation to struggle” between the branches
(Corwin, 1957). Presidents are not as free as the term commander in chief implies. They can take initia-
tives and make changes, but foreign policy transformations do not become “locked in” until they are
broadly accepted in the Congress. One of Theodore Roosevelt’s accomplishments was to convince
Congress to become fully involved in supporting American hegemony in the Western hemisphere,
though he had less success in selling legislators his global vision of America’s role in the world.6 Franklin
Roosevelt’s efforts to obtain Congressional support for his initiatives to help Britain were weak and gen-
erally ineffective until after the Congressional declaration of war in 1941, and Harry Truman’s initiatives
toward containment of the Soviet Union were not firmly in place until Senator Arthur Vandenberg pro-
vided bipartisan Congressional support. 
The extent to which public and Congressional opinion supports presidential initiatives depends upon
public awareness of changes in the world. That, in turn, is affected by whether there are crisis conditions
or not. Broadly speaking, there are four types of context regarding change in the structure of power in the
international system. First, in periods of “normality,” there is modest incremental change in the interna-





































such status quo periods, one would not expect leaders to express transformational objectives. Second,
there can also be periods of rapid change that is favorable to a country’s interests, and third, periods of
rapid unfavorable change. Finally, there are periods of crisis when the external environment visibly
demands response such as the sinking of American ships in 1917, Pearl Harbor in 1941, and September
11, 2001. In such visible crises, followers tend to demand foreign policy change by leaders. 
Thus it is not surprising that Wilson, FDR, and George W. Bush
responded in each case with inspirational rhetoric that stressed
transformational objectives. Designing foreign policy in periods
of rapid unfavorable change, such as the rise of German power
before each of the world wars, was more difficult. Wilson and
FDR’s followers did not initially support American involvement
in Europe’s conflicts, and the two leaders were appropriately cau-
tious in their public expressions of objectives. In periods of rapid
favorable change, such as the rise of American power at the
beginning of the 20th century or the collapse of the Soviet power
near the end of the century, leaders had more leeway in the
design of foreign policy. In the earlier case, McKinley was cau-
tious about expressing transformational objectives, Theodore
Roosevelt a little less so. But even Roosevelt was reluctant to
explain to Congress and the public why he was meddling in European affairs during the Morocco crisis in
1905-06. More recently, George H.W. Bush was cautious in expressing his objectives. His “new world
order” was more a post hoc rationalization than a plan. And Clinton used lofty rhetoric about enlargement
and engagement, but was cautious about preaching or implementing truly transformational objectives. 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF GRAND STRATEGY IN THE PAST CENTURY
As the twentieth century dawned, American industrial power surpassed that of Britain and Germany.
Simultaneously, the transportation revolution reduced America’s geographical separation from Europe.
Different American leaders responded to these developments in different ways. Theodore Roosevelt used
diplomacy to move the United States beyond hemispheric hegemony and to engage in global balance of
power politics. He sought to transform American foreign policy to fit its growing position in the world,
by using a combination of hard power (building the fleet, enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine) and soft
power (diplomacy, support for The Hague conference). William Taft focused more on preserving the sta-
tus quo by using commercial opportunities, dollar diplomacy and international law. Woodrow Wilson,
who came into office thinking primarily about domestic transformations, set aside Theodore Roosevelt’s
balance of power diplomacy and Taft’s dollar diplomacy. He ran on a peace platform in 1916. Eventually,
however, faced with German recalcitrance and crisis conditions in 1917, Wilson turned to war (as Teddy
Roosevelt had already advocated for several years); he coupled the use of hard power with inspirational
appeals for democracy and international institutional change. But the transformational goals he set out-
stripped his resources and he was unable to implement his policies. The 1920s and 1930s saw the rejec-
tion of his policies and American attitudes returned toward the more traditional distancing from the
European balance of power. 
According to John Gaddis, a major transformation then occurred under Franklin Roosevelt. After trying,
with limited success, to educate the American people about the rapid unfavorable change in the interna-
tional system that Hitler represented, Roosevelt built upon the opportunity provided by the surprise
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attack on Pearl Harbor to create alliances. In Gaddis’s view, Roosevelt expanded American hegemony by
scrapping isolationism and turning to multilateralism. Summarizing FDR’s approach, Gaddis notes, “He
never neglected, as Wilson did, the need to keep proclaimed interests from extending beyond actual capa-
bilities” (Gaddis, 2004, 47-64). Instead, FDR linked Wilsonian ideals to a realist vision, combining his
four-freedoms with the idea of four policemen represented by the permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council. And in the Bretton Woods institutions, FDR laid a basis for economic hege-
mony. He was adept at combining hard and soft power. In Gaddis’s words, he realized that “power is far
easier to maintain, in such situations, when it’s there by consent instead of coercion” (Gaddis, 2004, 47-
64). FDR laid the foundation for the rise of global institutions and American foreign policy that lasted
more than half a century, in part because of the success of Harry Truman in adapting FDR’s policies to
the changing situation at the end of World War II. In that sense, the transformation was of the result of
Roosevelt and Truman’s efforts. Subsequent Cold War presidents adapted to more incremental changes
within that framework. Even the successful foreign policy of George H.W. Bush, who presided over a major
transformation in the international system, was of the result of brilliant intuition and management of rapid
favorable change within the post-1945 framework rather than a conscious effort to transform the world. 
Gaddis sees the September 11 terrorist attacks as the precipitating crisis that led George W. Bush’s adminis-
tration to pursue a significant transformation of U.S. foreign policy. During the 2000 presidential election,
Bush had campaigned as a limited realist with little interest in foreign policy. But he became transforma-
tional in his objectives after 9/11. Gaddis argues that his new strategy reverted to America’s 19th century 
tradition of unilateralism, preemption and hegemony. However, like Wilson, FDR and Truman, George W.
Bush turned to the rhetoric of democracy–the default option in U.S. foreign policy– to rally his domestic 
followers in a time of crisis. Bill Clinton had also spoken about enlarging freedom and democracy, but the
1990s was a period in which the American people saw normality rather than unfavorable change.
Consequently, Clinton was unable to significantly alter U.S. grand strategy. Indeed, in Gaddis’s view, Clinton
lacked a grand strategy, and allegedly told Strobe Talbott that FDR and Truman “just made it up as they went
along” (Gaddis, 2004, 77). Gaddis argues that Clinton, like Harding and Coolidge, “allowed an illusion of
safety to produce a laissez-faire foreign and national security policy” (Gaddis, 2004, 77).
Gaddis describes Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy as an expansion of “John Quincy Adams’s
vision of continental hegemony through Franklin D. Roosevelt’s conception of a great power coalition,
aimed at containing, deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggressor states, to what is already being called
the Bush Doctrine: That the United States will identify and eliminate terrorists wherever they are, togeth-
er with the regimes that sustain them.” The solution to the roots of the terrorist problem is to spread
democracy everywhere. It is “Fukuyama plus force,” and is designed to make terrorism as obsolete as
slavery or piracy. When choosing where to first pursue this strategy, Gaddis argues “Iraq was the most
feasible place to strike the next blow” (Gaddis, 2004, 93). 
Gaddis cautions about the dangers of Bush’s transformational strategy, noting that the U.S. “exchanged
its long-established reputation as the principal stabilizer of the international system for one as it chief
destabilizer….This was a heavy price to pay to sustain momentum, however great the need for it may have
been.” As he plots the course of his second-term policy, Bush should realize that the revolutionary
Bismarck turned conservative. Unfortunately, Gaddis has found that “bad strategists don’t know when to
make this switch” (Gaddis, 2004, 101). Following 9/11, the Administration’s rhetoric was ragged, and
there was no clear voice of reassurance. It is also not clear that democracy is the blueprint for security in
the Middle East. John Quincy Adams feared America becoming the “dictatress of the world,” but Bush





































When Gaddis describes Bush’s foreign policy as the result of one of only three great transformations in
American foreign policy, he sets an artificially high threshold. If one sets the threshold at major changes
in American grand strategy, one can count six transformational changes over the past century.
Specifically, using Sternberg’s previously described categories of change, one should also include the
transformational objectives of Teddy Roosevelt’s diplomatic entanglements in a changing global balance
of power, Wilson’s entry into WWI, and Truman’s response to Stalin and the paralysis of the United
Nations. These changes can be measured in relation to the default option of the 19th century grand strat-
egy from which they depart. That 19th century strategy could be described as follows: in the Western hemi-
sphere: hegemony; in Europe: avoid entanglement; in Asia: open door for trade; in style: mostly unilateral.
MAJOR CHANGES IN U.S. GRAND STRATEGY OVER PAST CENTURY
1 Colonialism (1898-1902): The first major departure from the default model was the period of colo-
nial acquisition in the Caribbean and Pacific (Hawaii, Philippines, Guam) between 1898 and 1902.
The global political context was the rise of American power. President McKinley started with prima-
rily status quo objectives. His elite followers and the Congress were closely divided, and for a brief
period the expansionists prevailed and pressed him into a transformational policy (May, 1968). It
failed after the elite reunited on the default position, and the transformation never took root. 
2 Global balancing (1901-08): The second departure was Theodore Roosevelt’s efforts to involve the
United States in the global balance of power with his actions in Europe and Asia (exemplified by
his mediation of the Morocco crisis and the Russo-Japanese War). The context was again rising
American power. Roosevelt was able to obtain reluctant and partial public acceptance from his fol-
lowers. But while he succeeded in getting Congressional buy-in for hemispheric hegemony on issues
such as the Panama Canal, the Platt Amendment and the Dominican Republic, he did not fully
involve the legislative branch in his global innovations. While his policy change succeeded during
his presidency, he did not transform basic public attitudes about the balance of power, and the
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3 War in Europe and a global institution (1917-20): Woodrow Wilson initially made significant efforts
to avoid the European war. In the context of the rise of German power and a crisis over the sinking
of American ships, he developed a transformational response and was able to secure acceptance
from the public and a declaration of war from Congress when the crisis was clear. He lost support
after the war ended, his health failed, and he refused to compromise with opponents in Congress
over measures that would reconcile his global institution–the League of Nations–with American sov-
ereignty and hemispheric orientation. In subsequent elections, the public sought to return to the
“normalcy” of the default position. Consequently, Wilson’s attempted transformation was a failure
both during his term and for the next two decades. 
4 War in Europe and Asia; global institutions (1939-45): In the context of rising German and Japanese
power, Franklin Roosevelt developed transformational objectives but was unable to persuade the
majority of the public and Congress to pursue them until the attack on Pearl Harbor. At that point,
Congress agreed to declare war. FDR used the crisis and the war to mobilize support for his trans-
formational objectives, which succeeded during his term and that of his successor.
5 Containment, global institutions, and long term alliances (1947-91): In the context of the expansion
of Soviet power, Harry Truman pursued transformational changes (containment and permanent
alliances) to the grand strategy he inherited from FDR. Events and crises, such as the fall of
Czechoslovakia and the Korean War, provided him leverage to overcome the resistance from those
who preferred the isolationist default option. With Senator Vandenberg’s support, Congress approved
the Marshall Plan and ratified NATO. This transformation succeeded during Truman’s term (despite
his loss of popularity over the Korean War). Equally important, it provided the broad framework for
the foreign policies of his successors. 
6 Unilateralism, preventive war, and democratization (2001- ?): In the new context of unipolarity and
the realization of the threat of transnational terrorism, George W. Bush transformed American grand
strategy by reducing reliance on global institutions and permanent alliances in Europe. Before
September 11, his policies reflected the unilateralist approach that had gained strength in Congress
in the 1990s, and he was slow in assigning priority to the terrorist threat (Daalder & Lindsey, 2003).
However, after 9/11, Bush asserted a broad right of preventive war, as well as coercive democratiza-
tion as the primary solution to terrorism and anti-Americanism emanating from the Middle East. In
the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 crisis he was able to convince the majority of the public to
accept these changes, and he won Congressional support for the use of force in Iraq. After the inva-
sion, when the rationales of Weapons of Mass Destruction and a possible connection between Iraq
and 9/11 were disproven, public and Congressional support eroded, forcing Bush to increase his
emphasis on the transformational goal of spreading democracy–albeit with less emphasis on coercion. 
By the beginning of Bush’s second term, preventive war was downplayed and his approach to 
North Korea and Iran included more multilateralism than in the first term. In the words of one
observer, “The best way to assess the durability of the Bush doctrine is to ask how likely it is to be
applied again in the future” (Fukuyama, 2005). The success or failure of Bush’s transformation
remains uncertain, but at this time, two of its three pillars seem shaky. As one senior administra-
tion official said privately in 2005, “It is a good thing we won re-election. If we were judged only
on the first term, history might see us as a failure.”7 Top officials believe that the second term focus
on democratization will prove successful and sustainable beyond this Administration.
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Surveying these major changes in grand strategy, it is notable that while three succeeded during the term
of the leader, only two proved to be durable for more than a decade; the jury is, of course, still out on the
sixth. Two in a century suggests that successful transformational leadership in grand strategy is rare. The
two successes both occurred when followers’ perception of the need for change was heightened by crises.
But crises are not sufficient for lasting change, as Wilson’s experience proves. Whether George W. Bush
can build a durable transformation upon the 9/11 crisis or whether the problems of the Iraq War will
undercut his changes remains an open question. 
LEADERSHIP STYLES OF  TRANSFORMATIONAL PRESIDENTS
In this concluding section, I will speculate on the ways in which the traits and skills of presidents with
transformational objectives contributed to these outcomes. Fred Greenstein has listed six traits and skills
by which he judges presidential leadership (Greenstein, 2003). I have adapted them for foreign policy.
The first three are more relevant to inspirational style and the exercise of soft power to attract followers
at home and abroad. 
• Policy Vision is the ability to articulate an inspiring picture of the future. The vision 
has to be attractive to the various circles of followers, but also must be sustainable and
be an effective diagnosis of the situation in the world. One can judge the quality of a 
vision in terms of whether it creates a sensible balance between realism and risk, and 
whether it balances ideals with capabilities. Anyone can produce a wish list, but effec-
tive visions combine inspiration with feasibility. Franklin Roosevelt was good at this. 
• Emotional Intelligence is the self-mastery and discipline that allows leader to avoid 
distorting their public actions by personal passions. It also affects the consistency of 
their “charisma.” Does their personal magnetism hold up over changing contexts? 
Successful management of impressions and magnetism requires some of the same 
emotional discipline possessed by good actors. Ronald Reagan’s prior experience 
served him well in this regard. 
• Communication. Finally, an inspirational leader in foreign policy has to have the 
capacity to communicate effectively to domestic and foreign audiences. Good rhetor-
ical skills help to generate soft power, but leading by example is also important. 
Organizational skills can compensate for rhetorical deficiencies, but effective rhetoric 
can partly compensate for low organizational skills. Harry Truman was a modest 
orator, but compensated for the lack of rhetoric by ably managing a stellar set 
of advisors.
Three other traits and skills are more closely related to transactional skills and hard power. 
• Organizational Capacity refers to the ability to manage the structures of government 
to shape and to implement policy, including the effective management of flows of 
information regarding both inputs and outputs of decisions. How do presidents 
manage their inner circle of advisors to ensure an accurate flow of information and 
influence? How well do they avoid the “emperor’s trap” of only hearing how beautiful
their new clothes are? How thoroughly do they check for new information? How do 
they find out what is really happening in their government? George H.W. Bush, like 
Truman, knew how to manage an able group of advisors. George W. Bush has better 
political skills than his father, but his father had greater organizational capacity. 
“Anyone can pro-







































• Political Skill is obvious and crucial. It means finding means that are efficient and 
adequate to achieve the ends set forth in the vision, whether it be by bargaining, 
buying or bullying. In foreign policy, political skills must be both domestic and 
foreign, and must include the ability to balance hard and soft power. It means 
success in achieving goals not just for narrow groups of followers, but doing so in a 
manner which builds political capital with wider circles of followers at home and abroad. 
Lyndon Johnson was a successful politician for most of his career in domestic politics, 
particularly in the setting of the Senate, but he was less skillful in foreign politics. 
• Contextual Intelligence is defined by Anthony Mayo and Nitin Nohria as the ability to 
understand an evolving environment, and to capitalize on the sweeping trends of the 
times (Mayo & Nohria, 2005). They apply it to markets, but in foreign policy it is an 
intuitive diagnostic skill that helps align resources with objectives by moving with, 
rather than against the flow of events in a complex international system. It implies 
adaptability while still trying to shape events. It is analogous to what Bismarck once 
described as sensing God’s movements and grabbing his coattails. It is the self-made 
part of luck. Ronald Reagan, for example, was often faulted on his pure cognitive 
skills, but had a keen contextual intelligence. 
It is interesting to compare George W. Bush with Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. Each leader
faced a crisis which had a powerful effect on their followers. Each turned to the hard power of war com-
bined with the soft power of inspirational appeals regarding the promotion of democracy. The rhetoric of
democracy was useful to all three presidents in crisis situations, probably because it helped to inspire their
followers. All three men had started their terms focused on domestic concerns, and had little interest in
foreign policy. Wilson once said it would be ironic if he became known as a foreign policy president. FDR
was focused on the economic depression at home, and while he was interested in world affairs, he did not
focus on them. George W. Bush had little background in foreign policy. He promised a limited, “humble”
foreign policy, and focused successfully on domestic issues such as tax cuts and education reforms. 
Yet all three leaders, confronted with major crises, wound up pursuing transformational objectives in for-
eign policy. At first glance, this would suggest that it is the situation and context of crisis rather than indi-
vidual traits that determine whether a president becomes a successful transformational leader in foreign
policy. But that is not the whole story. FDR had the best contextual intelligence of the three leaders before
the crisis struck, and his efforts to rearm in the face of Hitler’s threat helped prepare the national
response after the crisis. George W. Bush paid almost no attention to the new threat of transnational ter-
rorism before the 9/11 crisis struck, and has been criticized for being ill prepared. Similarly, Woodrow
Wilson could not draw a clear picture in his mind of American interests during the early years of World
War I. Moreover, Wilson’s deficiencies in transactional skills on foreign policy, particularly in his later
years, contributed to his failure to achieve his transformational objectives. It is still too soon to judge
whether George W. Bush will follow in the path of Roosevelt or Wilson. 
There are some uncanny similarities between Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush. Both are highly reli-
gious and moralistic men who were elected initially with less than a majority of the popular vote, and
focused on domestic issues without any vision of foreign policy. Both were initially successful with their
domestic agendas in the Congress. Both tended to see the world in black and white rather than shades of
gray. Both projected self confidence, responded boldly after crisis struck and articulated clear foreign pol-
icy visions. Both were stubborn in persevering in their chosen strategy. Both relied on a close political


















































































quately manage information inputs. As Secretary of State Robert Lansing commented in 1917, “Even
established facts were ignored if they did not fit in with this intuitive sense, this semi-divine power to
select the right” (MacMillan, 2001, 10). Wilson did not have impressive organizational skills for running
the machinery of government. 
Although sometimes described as the first MBA-style president, Bush displayed some of the same orga-
nizational deficiencies as Wilson in sorting out the conflicting information he received in making his
decisions. As described by David Gergen, “Bush is a top-down, no-nonsense, decisive, macho leader who
sets his eye on the far horizon and doesn’t ‘go wobbly’ getting there” (Gergen, 2003, 15).  But informa-
tion flows were limited. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell reported that Bush “knows kind of what
he wants to do, and what he wants to hear is how to get it done” (Rothkopf, 2005, 33). According to
Powell’s chief of staff, Bush trusted Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld to make decisions, and “this furtive process was camouflaged neatly by the dysfunction and
inefficiency of the formal decision-making process.” Bush was decisive and persistent, but closed to new
information once his mind was made up. He was “too aloof, too distant from the details of postwar plan-
ning. Underlings exploited Bush’s detachment” (Wilkerson, 2005; Gearan, 2005). A White House official
confirmed this organizational chaos, noting that when Bush asked his military commanders if they had
enough troops, he was insufficiently aware of the climate in the Rumsfeld Pentagon that impeded a full
and frank answer.8 A 2004 report by Richard Kerr, former deputy director of central intelligence under
George H.W. Bush, concluded that George W. Bush “apparently paid little or no attention to prewar
assessments by the Central Intelligence Agency that warned of major cultural and political obstacles to
stability in postwar Iraq” (Jehl, 2005, 10). 
Both Wilson and Bush were stubborn and resistant to hearing new information once their minds were
made up. As a close advisor described Wilson, “Whenever a question is presented he keeps an absolutely
open mind and welcomes all suggestion or advice which will lead to a correct decision. Once a decision
is made it is final and there is an end to all advice and suggestion. There is no moving him after that”
(MacMillan, 2001, 5). While persistence can be an admirable trait in a leader, it can also be dangerous
when it blocks the cognitive process, impedes the flow of information, and slows course corrections. 
Both Wilson and Bush were willing to use force to achieve transformational policy objectives Though
Wilson started as an idealist and Bush as a realist, both wound up stressing the promotion of democracy
and freedom in the rest of the world as the central feature of their foreign policy vision. Both adhered to
American exceptionalism, and appealed to the uniqueness of American democratic ideas in a time of crisis.
In addition, both Wilson and Bush defined visions that had a large imbalance between expressed ideals
and national capacities. Many of Bush’s speeches sound like they could have been uttered by Wilson,
though Wilson was the superior rhetorician.
Conversely, Bush possesses skills that Wilson did not. He has a self mastery that failed Wilson at crucial
moments, relies less on inspirational oratory alone and more on transactional skills, is more willing to
bargain and generally more personable whereas Wilson was often stiff and aloof. Wilson once said he was
more interested in people than persons. Bush seems the opposite. Bush seems a more adept politician
and a less brittle person. Whether these differences in leadership skills will lead to different outcomes
remains open. 
Both Wilson and Bush invested considerable efforts in educating their followers to accept their picture of
the world system and the appropriateness of their transformational policy responses. In a sympathetic















































nation…requires transformative leadership by one who learns and teaches others to think anew and act
anew.” But Heclo also points out that “a president is always teaching. Not least of all, he is teaching peo-
ple about himself by teaching them about events. The less hard realism he teaches about events–the more
he mistakes selling for educating–the harder it will go for him in the long run….Bush clearly understands
the need for persuading people to his point of view, but it is also possible to sell people on things with-
out broadening their horizons. The paradox is that successful teaching requires ongoing learning on the
teacher’s part” (Heclo, 2003, 48-49).
David Gergen has described the difference between the boldness of FDR and George W. Bush: “FDR was
also much more of a public educator than Bush, talking people carefully through the challenges and
choices the nation faced, cultivating public opinion, building up a sturdy foundation of support before he
acted. As he showed during the lead-up to World War II, he would never charge as far in front of his fol-
lowers as Bush” (Gergen, 2003,15). Bush’s temperament seems less patient. In the words of a journalist
who spent many hours with him, “He has a transformational temperament. He likes to shake things up.
He says, ‘Don’t play small ball.’ That was the key to going into Iraq.”9 That
temperament also contributed to the organizational process Bush put in
place that did not encourage the ongoing learning that Heclo argues is
required for successful presidential education of the public. In his second
term, Bush made an effort to change the debate on Iraq by publicly
acknowledging new facts. But as one of the designers of his strategy said,
“It only worked because we married it up with admitting some mistakes
and that was quite a fight, because the president doesn’t talk that way”
(Sanger, 2005). 
Wilson succeeded initially in educating a majority of the American people about his vision of change.
He was a skillful rhetorician, and at one point, the League of Nations was quite popular. During his fateful
and near fatal Western tour, Wilson thought he could educate the public over the heads of their senators.
Notwithstanding the stroke that cut his trip short, it is highly likely that the Senate would have approved
the League if Wilson had been willing to make modest compromises with Henry Cabot Lodge or other
senators. Indeed, as mentioned above, some of Wilson’s work as a teacher remained as a long term lega-
cy in American foreign policy, though it was rejected in the two decades that immediately followed his
presidency. Whether George W. Bush will be able to persuade the American people of his characteriza-
tion of rapid unfavorable change and the appropriateness of his proposed foreign policy responses
remains to be seen. At the time of writing, some experts are challenging his diagnosis of democratiza-
tion of the Middle East as the solution to the terrorist threat, and polls show that the attraction of his
message is slipping at home as well as abroad. In any event, much of his legacy will depend upon 
the outcome of the preventive war in Iraq, which was his particular addition to the crisis created by 
Al Qaeda’s attack on 9/11. 
CONCLUSIONS
What this initial survey shows is that (1) the concept of transformational leadership, one of the most
prominent paradigms in organizational theories of leadership is too ambiguously defined to be useful in
debates over foreign policy leadership unless it is more carefully specified. (2) Even when so specified,
and one focuses on objectives and outcomes, it is remarkable how rare successful major transformation-
al leadership has been in foreign policy over the past century. It certainly is possible, but it is very diffi-
cult. (3) Leaders with transformational objectives or an inspirational style are not necessary for a
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successful foreign policy, even in periods of major change in the international context. George H.W. Bush
was a very successful foreign policy leader who faced dramatic changes in the international context, and
responded with status quo objectives, contextual intelligence and great transactional skills. (4) Nor, as
Harry Truman demonstrated, is an inspirational style necessary to achieve transformational objectives in
foreign policy. Moreover, (5) leaders with inspirational styles who successfully achieve transformational
objectives in domestic politics may find that their skills do not carry over into foreign policy–witness
Woodrow Wilson. 
From this preliminary survey, I conclude that (6) the prospects for successful transformational leadership
in foreign policy seem most likely in the context of international crisis. (7) But even then, it takes a com-
bination of soft power skills of cognitive and inspirational ability to outline a feasible vision, and great
transactional skills at home and abroad to implement the vision. Franklin Roosevelt had the combination.
Woodrow Wilson did not. George W. Bush has articulated transformational objectives, but has not yet
demonstrated an adequate transactional strategy to accomplish them. He remains an open case.
ENDNOTES
1 Personal communication, Cambridge, Massachusetts, May 2003.
2 And normatively, ought implies can.  If there are no real degrees of freedom, it is  difficult for us to judge 
different leaders.
3 For a discussion of how various definitions have come in and out of fashion over the decades, see Joanne Ciulla,
“Leadership Ethics: Mapping the Territory,” in Ethics: The Heart of Leadership (2nd ed), p.10; for Gardner’s 
commonsense definition, see On Leadership (1990), p. 1.
4 Though note that the aura of power sometimes migrates from position to person.  
5 For a good, clear treatment, see Barbara Kellerman, Bad Leadership (2004).  See also Burns’s preface to Ciulla,
Ethics (2004), and her ensuing discussion. 
6 I am indebted to Ernest May for making this point clear to me. 
7 Private conversation, December 2005.
8 Based on two personal interviews, March 2005.
9 Based on a personal interview, August 2005.
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